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IN THE SUPRE,ME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
TEDDY B. COVINGTON, by his
guardian ad litem, Mrs. J. B. Covington,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 8386

-vs.~IONT

C. CARPENTER,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATE~lE~~T

OF FACTS

In this action the plaintiff seeks to recover damages
from the defendant for injuries sustained by plaintiff
in a motorcycle-automobile accident that occurred October 3, 1953, at 11:25 A ..M. in front of the Salt Lake Cleaning and D;'eing Company on 9th South Street between
2nd and 3rd East Streets in Salt Lake City, Utah, (R.
1-2, 24, 25). At the time of the accident plaintiff was 19
years of age, (R. 37). He had, however, married on
,January 4, 1955, (H. 44), and thereby attained his
majority.
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Ninth South Street at this point proceeds in a general easterly and westerly direction and is straight and
practically level, (R. 46). The weather was clear, the
street was dry, and visibility was good, (R. 29, 30, 53).
There was a cut-back parking area 19 feet in depth in
front of the Salt Lake Cleaning and Dyeing Company
located on the north side of 9th South Street, (R. 30).
There was an 8 foot parking lane on the north side of
9th South Street, two 10 foot westbound traffic lanes,
and a series of 4 center lines in the middle of the street
occupying a space of approximately 4 feet. There were
also two eastbound traffic lanes each 10 feet in width,
and an 8 foot parking lane south of the center line of
said street, (R. 25, 35, 36).
The plaintiff had operated his Inotorcycle north on
5th East to 9th South Street where he made a left turn
into the inside lane for westbound traffic and was proceeding west along said 9th South Street about in the
1niddle of the said inside lane for westbound traffic at a
speed of approximately 25 miles per hour when he
reached 3rd East Street, (R. 37, 48).
The defendant's vehicle had been parked on the
north side of 9th South Street in the cut-back parking
area in front of the Salt Lake Cleaning and Dyeing
Company. The defendant was in the act of backing his
auto from said cut-back parking area immediately prior
to the time that the accident occurred, (R. 37, 38). The
west crosswalk at the intersection of 3rd East and 9th
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South Street was located right close to the west curb
line of 3rd East, (R. 46, 47). It was undisputed that the
impact occurred 137 feet west of the extended west curb
line of 3rd East Street and 3 feet into the inside lane for
westbound traffic or 7 feet north of the north-most of
the series of 4 lines forming the center of 9th South
Street, (R. 25, 26, 27, 28, 31, 51, 52).
The plaintiff testified that when his motorcycle was
about in the middle of the west crosswalk close to the
west curb line of 3rd East Street, he observed the defendant's automobile in the act of backing out in a southeasterly djrection from the recessed area in front of the
Salt Lake Cleaning and Dyeing Company, (R. 38, 40, 47).
At that time he was traveling approximately in the
middle of the inside lane for westbound traffic, (R. 4748). He could definitely see that the car was backing
out onto 9th South, (R. 48), but was not clear whether the
rear was into the parking lane or whether it may have
projected somewhat into the outside traffic lane, (R. 49).
At this time there was no other westbound traffic on
the street between his motorcycle which was then up in
the west crosswalk and the defendant's backing automobile. As a matter of fact, the closest westbound traffic
was down near 2nd East Street. There was no eastbound
traffic on the street at the time. The plaintiff in this
connection testified :

"Q.
A.

So you didn't have any traffic in front of you
that you had to be concerned with, did ~'on?
That is correct.
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Q.

Either going the same direction you were
going or coming towards you~

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

There was nothing that had to concern or involve you there at all~

A.

No sir.

Q.

The only thing that could possibly enter into
your path or cause yott any concern when yon
were up by the west cross walk of 3rd East
Street was this automobile that was backing
out into the street, isn't that correct?

A.

That is correct.

Q.

And yet you took your eyes from that automobile for awhile, didn't you?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

And looked to the rear?

A.

Yes sir.

Q.

And is that the only place that you ever
looked, is to the rear~

A.

As I recall, yes." (R. 49-50) (Italics ours)

The plaintiff admitted that he did not intend to
change lanes, but 1nerely looked to the rear to see what
traffic there \vas (R. 50). As a matter of fact, he admitted that there was no traffic close enough to the rear
of his motorcycle to actually cause him any concern, (R.
53).
After taking his eyes from the only car which could
cause him any concern, he admittedly traveled forward
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a distance of 120-125 feet at a speed of approximately
25 miles per hour, all of the time \vhile continuously looking to the rear, (R. 50-51). 'Vhen he again looked to the
front, he observed the defendant's automobile not more
than 10-15 feet a·way. Its rear end at that tune was just
barely emerging into the inside traffic lane, (R. 51). He
attempted to turn to the left, but in the short space did
not have time to completely miss the car, but did succeed
in turning the motorcycle away from the car so that no
part of his motorcycle came in contact with the vehicle,
(R. 39, 44, 45, 52). However, his right leg struck the
extreme left rear corner of the automobile about where
the left rear tail light was located, (R. 45). At the time
of the accident he admitted that the automobile only
projected three feet into the jnside traffic lane and that
he still had seven feet in the inside traffic lane before
even reaching the north-most of the four center lines in
\vhich he could have traveled to avoid the accident had he
seen the car earlier, (R. 51-52). During all of the time
he was traveling forward and looking backward, he did
not reduce his speed at all, (R. 52). l-Ie admitted that the
left rear of the automobile was the portion thereof which
projected the farthest out into the street, (R.
Following the accident, he was

l~'ing

~2).

on tho south

side of 9th South Street at a point 75 feet west of the
point of impact. His motorcycle came to rest on the
south side of 9th South Street 115 feet from the point of
impact, (R. 25, 52-;)3).
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The court questioned the plaintiff concerning the
n1anner in which the defendant's automobile was being
-backed out into the street. The plaintiff admitted that
it was being backed in an angular direction; that its
speed was moderate, and that there was nothing unusual
about its operation:
"THE COURT: And in what manner was the
defendant's car being backed out into the
road~

A.

It was in well, an angular direction.

THE COURT: And do you have any idea how
fast it was being backed~
A.

No. I have no idea. All I know it was a
moderate back.

THE COURT: Nothing unusual about it?
A.

Well, not that I could recollect. Except that
it just seemed like it was out there and that
was it." (R. 54) (Italics ours)

According to Officer V algardson, the defendant said
he hadn't observed any danger, (R. 27), and the defendant further claimed that he had ceased his backward
movement and was starting forward when the accident
occurred, (R. 30). The plaintiff contended that the defendant's vehicle was still in its backing process at the
tirne of the accident, (R. 53).
The defendant introduced certain photos as exhibits
showing the recessed parking area and the street adjacent thereto, (Exhibits 11, 12 and 13). In addition, the
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defendant offered in evidence certain photos showing
the damage to the defendant's vehicle in the accident,
(Exhibits 10, 14 and 15 ).
The diagram incorporated in the back of the appellant's brief was not an exhibit in the case. It admittedly
was not drawn to scale as the 137 feet from the point of
impact to the west curb line of 3rd East Street is shown
as being much shorter than the 113 feet from the point
of impact to the point where the motorcycle came to rest.
Obviously, the point of impact is located considerably
further from the west curb line than would be indicated
in the diagram. The measurements shown thereon, however, were those testified to by the officer and were all
made either by steel tape or by a measuremeter, (R. 36).
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's case the defendant
moved for a directed verdict on the ground and for the
reason that the plaintiff had failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that any negligence on the
part of the defendant proximately caused the accident
and that the plaintiff's own evidence as a matter of law
showed that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which proximately contributed to the accident, (R.
54, 55). The lower court granted the defendant's rnotion,
(R. 55-57), and it is from the judgment of the court on the
directed verdict that the plaintiff takes the appeal, (R.
()2). The only question is whether the court erred in

granting the defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOR ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S TES'TIMONY.
(a) THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BY A PRE-

PONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE
WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
(b) THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY AND
MATTER OF LAW DISCLOSED THAT THE
TIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY
GENCE WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED
TIFF'S ACCIDENT AND INJURY.

AS A
PLAINNEGLIPLAIN-

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOR ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S TESTIMONY.
(a) THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE BY A PRE-

PONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT THE.
DEFENDANT WAS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE
WHICH PROXIMATELY CAUSED THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES.
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The burden of proof was on the plaintiff to show by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was
negligent and that his negligence proximately caused the
accident. The plaintiff's proof indicated that the defendant was in the act of backing his car out into the street
and the rear end thereof had ernerged into the parking
lane or the outside traffic lane when the plaintiff's motorc-ycle was up near the west curb line of 3rd East Street
or approximately 137 feet away. The evidence also indicated that the defendant's vehicle was being operated
at a "moderate" speed. There was nothing unusual about
it which the plaintiff could recollect. The vehicle was
being backed out into the street in an "angular direction"
to the southeast. Officer Y algardson's testilnony would
indicate that the vehicle was backing out into the street
at a speed of 2-3 miles per hour, (R. 31). The evidence
is undisputed that at the time of the accident the left rear
corner of the defendant'~ automobile projected the farthest out into the street and it was only 3 feet into the
inside westhound traffic lane at the time of the accident,
leaving 7 feet in that lane to the north-most of the 4 center lines in which the plaintiff could have traveled. The
evidence is also undisputed that the plaintiff's motorcycle
did not contact the automobile at all, the impact being on
the plaintiff's right leg against the extreme left rear
corner of the defendant's automobile. Officer Valgardson
testified that following the accident the defendant informed him that he did not observe the danger until the
moment of the impact.
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The above and foregoing is all of the evidence in the
case offered by the plaintiff to show negligence on the
part of the defendant and to prove that such negligence
was the proximate cause of the accident. Certainly, the
testimony did not indicate any negligence in the manner
or speed at which the vehicle was being operated. The
only negligence claimed by the plaintiff in his brief is
that the defendant did not yield the right of way to the
plaintiff and that the defendant failed to keep a proper
lookout. Elsewhere in the plaintiff's brief there are intinlations that the defendant was negligent in backing
so that the rear of his vehicle projected in any manner
into the inside traffic lane.
With reference to the alleged failure to yield the
right of way, plaintiff quotes Section 41-6-100 and Section 41-6-106, Utah Code Annotated 1953. Section 41-6100 has no application whatsoever to the facts in this
case. The defendant was not emerging from an alley,
driveway, or building. Furthermore, his vehicle had been
parked in the recessed parking area which was only 19
feet deep. Before the defendant started the vehicle backward, he would already have been in a stopped position.
Section 41-6-106 does not prohibit a vehicle from
backing out into the street, but merely requires that
it shall not proceed backward unless such movement can
be made with reasonable safety and without interfering
with other traffic. The plaintiff's motorcycle was admittedly about 137 feet away when the defendant's vehicle
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was already in the process of its backward motion and
when the rear end of the defendant's automobile may
already have extended out into the outside traffic lane.
\Vhen the defendant actually started his backward motion, the motorcycle would have been even further away.
Considering the admitted low speed of the defendant's
auto and the 25 miles per hour at which the plaintiff
was traveling, the motorcycle would have to be at least
150 feet or a quarter of a block or more away when the
defendant started to back out from his parked position.
Under such circumstances it was reasonably safe under
the statute for the defendant to back out. It was then
the plaintiff's duty to yield the right of way to the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant's backing did not
interfere with other traffic. The plaintiff still had 7
feet in his own lane of traffic to the northmost of the
four center lines and as a matter of fact all of the rest
of the street in which to travel. His progress was not
interfered with even on his own side of the road.
See 2 Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice, Permanent Edition, 1955 Cumulative Pocket
Part, page 45, Sec. 1101, wherein it is said:
''A motorist backing onto a highway, if in
the exercise of due care, has the right to assume
that an approaching motorist will exerci~e due
care, and the conduct of the backing driver should
be measured in view of such assumption."

With referPne<> to the intimation of negligence on
the

defendant'~

part in backing so that the left rear
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corner of his car projected 3 feet into the inside lane,
it must be borne in mind that an autonwbile is approximately 20 feet in length. rrhe distance frOln the curb
line out to the farthest point at which the defendant'~
vehicle projected into the street was only 21 feet. Even
though the defendant's vehicle was backing in a southeasterly direction, considering the width of the street
and the length of the car, it would require the vehicle to
proceed out into the street and son1ewhat into the inside
traffic lane in order to proceed westward along the
street. Any reasonably individual would anticipate such
action. Accordingly, there can be no negligence on the
part of the defendant in this regard.
Even if we are to concede that the defendant was
negligent in failing to keep a proper lookout or that he
was negligent in either of the other particulars, nonetheless the plaintiff \vholly failed to prove that such negligence on the part of the defendant proximately caused
the accident. If the defendant had seen the plaintiff's
1notorcycle when he started to back out into the street,
the motorcycle would have been somewhere in the intersection approxinmtely 150 feet or a quarter of a block
or more away. This must follow because when the defendant's vehicle was actually in the backing process
with its rear extending perhaps into the outside westbound traffic lane, the plaintiff's motorcycle was then
admittedly 137 feet away. If in fact the defendant had
seen the plaintiff's motorcycle when he started to back,
the defendant under such circumstances would have the
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right to proceed with his backward motion. If he had
seen the plaintiff's motorcycle at the time the plaintiff
first saw the defendant's vehicle, the defendant would
still have the right to continue in his backward process
and to assume that the plaintiff would slow down or turn
out without proceeding directly into him. The defendant
had not blocked the plaintiff's path. There was still
7 feet in the inside lane for westbound traffic to the
northmost of the 4 center lines in which the plaintiff
could have traveled. We, therefore, cannot see how any
negligence on the part of the defendant in the matter
of lookout or otherwise could have been a proximate
cause of the accident. The proximate cause of the accident was the plaintiff's failure to slow down, turn out,
or otherwise act to avoid the accident with opportunity
so to do.
(b) THE EVIDENCE CONCLUSIVELY AND AS A
MATTER OF LAW DISCLOSED THAT THE PLAINTIFF WAS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE WHI·CH PROXIMATELY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S ACCIDENT AND INJURY.

When the plaintiff was 120-125 feet away, or about
in the middle of the west crosswalk, he actually observed
the defendant's vehicle in the process of backing out
into the street from the 19 foot recessed parking area.
The rear of the defendant's vehicle at that time was
emerging ejther into the parking lane or perhaps into
th~

outside \\'estbound traffic lane. Plaintiff attempts

to make much of the statement that the vehicle was
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backing at an angle to go out into the first lane of traffic.
Actually, the plaintiff did not know into what lane of
traffic the vehicle was going. He knew that it was backing at an angle in a southeasterly direction, and, what
is more important, he knew when he first saw it that
it was the only vehicle on the street which could possibly
enter his path or cause him any concern. This was what
the court had in mind when he said that the plaintiff
was aware of a vehicle approaching into his path. The
uncontradicted testimony was that there were no other
vehicles on the street to cause the plaintiff any concern
other than the defendant's backing automobile. The plaintiff admitted this car might enter his path and cause him
some concern. Actually, when the plaintiff first saw the
defendant's vehicle, all he saw was that it was backing out
into the street and might possibly enter his path and
cause him some concern. Nonetheless, he took his eyes
from the one and only point at which he stated there was
any danger, and looked to the rear. Furthermore, he
continued to look to the rear for 120-125 feet, all the
tin1e while proceeding forward into the one known source
of possible danger. Plaintiff claims that by reason of
the speed at which the plaintiff was traveling he would
cover the distance of 120-125 feet in approximately 3
seconds. This in our opinion makes the plaintiff's conduct even more negligent. To continue to travel forward at a speed of 25 miles per hour into the face of a
possible known danger while continuously looking backward is, in our opinion, not only negligent but foolhardy.
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Furthermore, there was nothing which required the
plaintiff's attention to the rear for a period of 3 seconds
or more. He admitted he was not going to change traffic
lanes and, as a matter of fact, admitted there were
no vehicles close enough to his rear to cause him any
concern. Notwithstanding this, he continued to look to
the rear when he knew the only possible source of danger was in the front.
Plaintiff claims that when he saw the defendant's
vehicle the second time he was too close to it and then
was confronted with a sudden e1nergency and did all
that was possible to extricate himself therefrom. The
plaintiff is not entitled to the benefit of the sudden
emergency doctrine. An emergency must be one that has
not been created by the plaintiff. In this case if the plaintiff did find himself in a position from which he could not
extricate himself, it was solely due to his negligence in
continually looking backward while proceeding forward
into his one known possible danger. The sudden emergency doctrine does not apply to the plaintiff under the
evidence in this case. See Blashfield Cyclopedia of Automobile Law & Practice, Volume 1, Part 2, Page 547, Sec.

669:
"The rule of sudden emergency * * * cannot
be invoked by one who has brought that emergency upon himself by his own wrong or who has
not used due care to avoid it."
See also Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah (2d) 392,
wherein the Utah Supreme Court said:
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"* * * vVhere the plaintiff creates the peril
by his own fault, he may not thereafter urge the
sudden emergency doctrine to protect himself
from a charge of contributory negligence."
Plaintiff contends in his brief that when he first
saw the defendant's vehicle he had the right to assume
that the defendant would not interfere with his approaching motorcycle and thereby infers that he could become
completely oblivious to what the defendant did. Plaintiff
also takes the position that he had the right to assume
that the defendant would back out into the outside traffic lane and by reason thereof was not required to look
forward again. Such arguments can have no weight,
particularly in view of the plaintiff's admission that he
kne\v when he first saw the defendant's backing automobile that it was the only vehicle on the street which
could possibly cross his path or cause him any concern.
With such knowledge, the plaintiff had no right to continuously look to the rear.
Plaintiff cites frmn Blashfield Cyclopedia of Auton1obile Law and Practice, Volume 2, Par. 1105, page 426,
to the effect that an approaching motorist on a highway
is entitled to assume that the latter will operate his
autmnobile with due care and caution and leave a space
open for his passage. The rights as between the backing
driver and the approaching motorist are relative as is
clearly indicated by the citation from 2 Blashfield
C~rclopedia

of Automobile Law and Practice, 1955

Cumulative Pocket Part, page 45, Sec. 1101, supra, page
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11, wherein the converse of the rule as stated by the plaintiff is set forth. There it is indicated that the backing
motorist has the right to assume that the approaching
motorist will exercise due care. Regardless of any negligence on the part of the defendant, the conduct on the
part of the plaintiff in proceeding forward without reducing his speed and while continuously looking to the
rear is contributory negligence as a matter of law,
particularly with plaintiff's knowledge of the fact that
the vehicle was backing out into the street when he was
120-123 feet away, and with his admission that the backing vehicle was the only one which could possibly cause
him any concern.
Conceding for the purpose of argument that the
plaintiff had the right of way over the defendant's backing automobile, this would not justify the plaintiff in
failing to keep a proper or reasonable lookout for the
only vehicle which admittedly could cross his path or
cause him any concern. See Bullock v. Luke, 98 Utah 501,
98 Pac. (2d) 350. In that case a motorcyclist approaching an intersection at a speed of :25 miles per hour failed
to observe a truck on his left until he was within 20 feet
of the intersection, notwithstanding the fact that his view
was obstructed for a distance of 200 to 800 feet. This
Court held the motorcyclist to be guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law in failing to observe the
truck sooner and for insisting upon his right of way.
The court said :
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"The circumstances may be such, that by his
own conduct, he who has the apparent right of
way has lost the benefit of that right; or the circumstances may be such that for him to insist
that this position on the right entitled him to
proceed first through the intersection would be
carelessness and negligence upon his part. * * * "
In Hickok r. Skinner, 113 Utah 1, 190 Pac. (2d) 514,
this Court held a plaintiff guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law for failure to keep a proper
lookout, saying:
"Granted that the defendant should have
yielded the right of way, that does not absolve
plaintiff of negligence for his prolonged inattention to the traffic that was approaching west on
21st South. He testified that, having once seen
defendant's autmnobile approaching the intersection 400 to 500 feet to the east, he started his car
forward from a point 20 feet back frmn the intersection, drove into and almost across the intersection or a distance of 65 feet, without ever
again looking in the direction from which defendant's car was approaching. For a period of approximately six to Beven and one-half seconds,
the plaintiff never looked to the east on 21st
South Street, from which direction he knew there
was a car coming. ***** The fact that the plaintiff had the right of way over the defendant did
not permit him, after having observed the defendant's car approaching the intersection, to thereafter completely ignore it, even though at the time
he started he 1night reasonabl:v have believed he
had time in which to get safely across. ***** The
time element, ez-en if it 1cere less than is shmrn
by the evidence, 1ras such that a reasonably pruSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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dent and careful person would have glanced to
the east several times while traversing the distance from the stop sign to the point of collision."
(Italics ours)

In ~iingtts v. Olsson, 11-l: Utah 505, 201 Pac. (2d)
4:95, this Court held a pedestrian to be guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to
keep a proper lookout, notwithstanding the fact that he
was in the crosswalk and had the right of way over the
defendant's vehicle, saying:
"A pedestrian crossing a public street in a
crosswalk or pedestrian lane, although he may
have the right of way over vehicular traffic, nonetheless has the duty to observe for such traffic.
Clearly, decedent neglected that duty in this case.
It follows that he was contributorily negligent as
a matter of law. Of course we do not mean to
imply that a mere glance in the direction of the
approaching automobile would suffice. The duty
to look has inherent in it the duty to see what is
there to be seen, and to pay heed to it."
In Conklin v. Walsh, 113 Utah 276, 193 Pac. (2d)
437, a motorist who was proceeding on an arterial highway was held guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout for a vehicle
approaching from the nonfavored highway. The Court
said:
"Defendant's truck driver, knowing there was
a car approaching from the north, never again
looked in that direction until it was too late to
avoid a collision. By his own admission the truck
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driver travelled at least one quarter of a block
without 1naking any further observation of a car
which, at the time he first saw it, was much
nearer the intersection than was his. lie asserts
his attention was focused on traffir that might
be coming fron1 the south. If, as he claims, he
was unable to get a clear view to the south on
lOth East Street, there was nothing to prevent
him from reducing the speed of his truck so as
to permit a reasonable opportunity to observe
the approach of cars from other directions. In
this case we have the driver of a truck travelling
between 30 and 45 mph who knows a car is approaching from his left, keeping his eyes on
what he claims to be a blind corner on his right,
and ignoring the approach of the vehicle from
his left, because of the assumption that as to the
latter car he has the right of way. *:K-**** He
thereafter completely ignored the Conklin car
and drove blindly ahead without again checking
the position and movement of the other car until
too late to avoid colliding with it. The defendant
truck driver was not justified in thus ignoring
the 1novement of plaintiff's automobile. The duty
to keep a proper lookout applies as well to the
favored as to the disfavored driver. Neither
driver can excuse his own failure to observe because the other driver failed in his duty. Neither
driver is at any time to be excused for want of
vigilance or failure to see what is plain to be
seen. Drivers are pennitted to cross over arterial
highways after having stopped. True, they must
yield the right of way to cars which are close
enough to constitute an immediate hazard. This
rule, however, requires the exercise of some judgment. There is still a duty on the part of the driver
travelling the arterial highway to remain reasonably alert to the possibility of the disfavored
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driver starting across the intersection in the belief that he can cross in safety. The d~tty of keeping a proper lookout attends all those operating
motor vehicles, and other rules of the road do
not relieve any driver of the necessity of complying 1cith this req~tirement." (Italics ours)
The plaintiff in his brief relies upon the case of
v. Stevens, ________ Utah ________ , 243 Pac. (2d) 747.
The facts in that case bear no similarity to the
facts in the case at bar. In the Stevens case both vehicles
were approaching a blind intersection. In speakig of the
plaintiff's conduct, the court said:

~llartin

"We must remember that there were three
other streets to give some attention to as he approached the intersection. All of the attention
could not very well or safely be focused on any
one at any given instant. Remaining aware of the
others and giving them secondary attention, the
plaintiff would look to the west, as he said he
did, to observe for the favored traffic to which
he must give right of way, if any was near. He
then looked to the east and saw no car within
the extent of his vision, 150 to 200 feet. At that
instant he was entitled to assume, absent anything to warn him to the contrary, that any car
approaching from that direction would do so at a
lawful rate of speed, that is, not to exceed about
25 miles per hour. He then changed his main
attention back to the intersection and the south
and west and proceeded." (Italics ours)
In that case in analyzing the cases of Hickok v.
Skinner, Conklin v. Walsh, and Bullock v. Luke, supra,
the Utah Supreme Court said:
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"**** the circumstances were such that the
driver held to be negligent as a matter of law,
either observed, or in the exercise of due care
should have observed, the manner in which the
other driver was approaching the intersection and
clearly could by ordinary reasonable care have
avoided the collision."
'l'he facts in the case at bar come within the doctrine
announced in Hickok v. Skinner, Conklin v. Walsh and
Bullock 1:. Luke, and not under the facts in the Martin
v. Stevens case. In the case at bar the plaintiff actually
saw the defendant's vehicle in the process of backing
out into the street when he was 120-125 feet away. He
actually knew that it was the only vehicle which could
possibly cross his path or cause him any concern. There
were no other vehicles either eastbound or westbound
on the highway in front of him and no vehicles in close
proximity to his rear. He was not going to change lanes
of traffic and there were no intersecting streets. His
attention should have been directed to the one source
which admittedly could cause him concern. His failure
to continue to make further observations or to slow down
while traveling forward a distance of 120-125 feet constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law.
Certainly had the plaintiff been keeping a proper lookout, he could have avoided the accident in its entirety.
A change of 2 or 3 feet at most in his course would
have completely avoided the accident. He had seven feet
on his own side of the road before even reaching the
north-most of the four renter lines of the highway within
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which to make this turn, and, as a matter of fact, he
had all of the south half of the road since there were no
approaching eastbound vehicles.
A case involving somewhat similar, although distinguishing facts, is Spackman v. Carson, 117 Utah 390,
216 Pac. (2d) 640. In that case a motorcyclist sought
to recover damages as a result of a collision with a truck.
The motorcyclist \\·as proceeding along the highway and
first observed the truck at a distance of about 200 feet.
It \Vas parked off the paved portion of the highway in
front of a dwelling. The motorcyclist did not thereafter
observe the truck until it was about 30 feet away and
on the high\vay in front of him, and he was then unable
to avoid the accident. In that case it was contended that
the motorcyclist was guilty of contributory negligence
as a matter of law and that the court erred in failing to
grant the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. The
Court stated that the facts involved "a close case" and
one which "must stand strictly on its own facts." In
holding that the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was properly refused, the Court said:

"Nate that this is not the case of a vehicle
parked off the pavement under such circumstances
as would give warning that the driver had moved
off the pavement onto the shoulder of th•e road
only momentarily and might at any moment move
back onto it as frequently happens with the traveling public. ***** Had the plaintiff when he observed the truck standing on the shoulder of the
highway, known or had reason to believe that the
tntck was about ready to enter upon the pave-
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ment, there might be merit in the defendant's assignment of error. But according to the plaintiff's
testimony, when he first observed the truck it
was standing motionless in front of a dwelling
and there was no indication whatever that it was
about to be moved onto the pavement. The plaintiff was not alerted to any iJnmedinte danger.
Under these circumstances we are convinced that
the issue of whether the plaintiff was negligent
in failing to keep a more diligent lookout ahead
was properly submitted to the jury."

The Court further said:
"It can be seen from the above that any slight
change in the situation might change the question from one for the jury to one for the court
as a matter of law." (Italics ours)

The Court distinguishes the Spaclnnan case from
Conklin v. Walsh on the ground that in the Spackman
case the plaintiff was not alerted to the danger, whereas in the Conklin case he was. Here again we submit
that the one factor which this Court indicated was absent
in the Spackman case was in fact present in the case at
bar, to-wit: the plaintiff in the case at bar \vas clearly
alerted to the danger. He actually saw the vehicle when
120-125 feet away and admitted that it was the only
vehicle which could possibly cross his path or cause him
any concern. Nonetheless, he chose to cmnpletely

di~

regard its presence.
As we review the rtah divisions where a motorist is
alerted to a possible danger he is not thereafter justified
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in failing to keep a proper lookout at the source or direction of that danger, and if he fails to do so, he is
guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.
This is exactly what the plaintiff did in the case at bar,
and under the Utah authorities it must necessarily follow
that he was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law in failing to keep a proper lookout.
See also Jlurphy v. Watson) (Pa.) 197 A. 151, wherein it is said:
"After carefully reading the testimony, we
are in agreement with the court below that appellant was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law. She was injured in a private areaway in use by cars, and although she knew that
an automobile was being operated in dangerous
proximity to her) she did not look out for its
approach." (Italics ours).
In considering the lookout maintained by the plaintiff, it should be borne in mind that there were no circumstances present in the case at bar which would justify
the plaintiff in looking anywhere other than straight
ahead. rrhe :\Iinnesota court in the case of Dreyer v.
Otter Tail PoU'cr Co.) 285 N.W. 707, has had occasion to
comment on distracting circumstances which would
justify one in diverting his attention elsewhere. The
Court in that case said:
"The argument for plaintiff misconceives
what is meant in the law of negligence by the
phrase 'distracting circumstances.' No court has
attempted to give an exclusive definition, and we
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make no such atte~npt. But it is clear that therl!
must be not only another danger from which attention may be diverted, but also that the circumstances relied upon as distracting must be such
as of the~nselves 1nay reasonably be considered to
portend danger. City of Radford v. Calhoun, 165
V a. 24, 181 S.E. 345, 100 A.L.R. 1378; Carborne
v. Boston & Me. R. 89 N.H. 12, 192 A. 858, 3
Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and
Practice, Perm. Ed., Sec. 1748."
In the case of Hickok v. Skinner, supra, the Utah
Supreme Court indicated that the evidence in that case
failed to establish any traffic situation which would
justify the plaintiff in failing to make a further re-appraisal of the situation as he proceeded forward.
See also Smith v. Bennett, ____ Utah 2d ____ , 265 Pac.
(2d) 401, wherein the Utah Supreme Court has again considered the question of lookout and distracting circumstances. The lower court had directed a verdict in favor
of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff, a
pedestrian, was guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law in failing to keep a proper lookout. In
affirming the judgment this court distinguished the
Smith case frmn the case of

JJf art in

v. Stevens and other

like cases, saying:
"A major dissimilarity exists between the
facts of the case now before the court and plaintiff's authorities. In these cases we were concerned with situations such as intersectional accidents where the plaintiff's attention was demanded in more than one direction or in more
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than one place. Since his attention could not be in
all places and in all directions at once, it was a
question of human judgment as to how his attention should be distributed mnong the several competing demands. A question of fact for the jury
was presented as to whether his distribution of
attention was reasonable. In the instant case there
was but one demand rztpon plaintiff's attention.
There is no room for a reasonable difference of
opinion as to where her attention should have
been concentrated; it was inctunbent upon her to
observe the condition of approaching traffic. That
she failed to use due care in doing so is manifest
frmn the evidence." (Italics ours).
In the case at bar there was but one demand upon
the plaintiff's attention, namely, the defendant's auto,
which according to the plaintiff was the only auto which
could possibly cross his path or cause him concern. There
is therefore no room for a reasonable difference of
opinion as to the place where the plaintiff's attention
should have been concentrated.
See also Parrack v. McGaffey, (Iowa) 251 N.W. 871,
wherein the Iowa court said:
"It is the settled rule of law, where one voluntarily places himself in a position of danger which
can be seen and appreciated, he is guilty of contributory negligence, as a matter of law."
In this case the plaintiff not only appreciated the
possible danger, but continued headlong towards it while
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continuously looking to the rear. Under such circumstances he was guilty of contributory negligence as a
n1atter of law.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff failed to prove by a preponderance of
the evidence in the case that the defendant was negligent,
or, if negligent, that such negligence was the proximate
cause of the accident. Furthermore, the plaintiff's evidence conclusively and as a 1natter of law showed that
the plaintiff \vas guilty of contributory negligence. The
lower court, therefore, properly granted the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict. The judgment should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG,
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent,

604-610 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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